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Appeals. Tafflin v. Leritt, 865 F.2d
that the claim was procedurally barred
Appellant incurred sorne cost in cornply595(4th Cir. 1989). The Suprerne Court
under California state law. Therefore, the
ing with the generally applicable sales
granted certiorari solely for the purpose
Court concluded that the claim was not
and use tax, the Court noted that Appelof determining whether a state court has
properly before it.
lant is no rnore burdened by the imposiconcurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO
1bis case is Significant in that it adtion of such tax than it is by other
dresses a classical first adrnendrnent issue
claims.
generally applicable regulations, such as
In reaching its decision, the Suprerne
to
religion
and
the
free
exerpertaining
health and safety regulations, with which
Court began by ernphasizing the deep
cise thereof, yet adapts it to a rnore rnodAppellant already cornplies. Id
ernistic view. Today, rnore and rnore
rooted presumption in favor of concurIn its next argument, the Appellant
evangelists
are
thernselves
excessively
rent state court jurisdiction. This precontended that under Lemon v. Kurtzentangling religious and commercial actisumption is rebuttable only upon a
man, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the irnposivities, thereby making it difficult to disshowing that: (1) there is an explicit
tion of the sales and use tax was violative
between
the
two.
However,
the
tinguish
congressional statute granting exclusive
of the Establishment Clause in that it
Suprerne Court has atternpted to rernedy
federal court jurisdiction; (2) there is an
"foster [ed] 'an excessive government enthis confusion by upholding tax imposiunmistakable implication frorn legislatanglernent with religion' ... [by requirtions
on
the
sale
of
both
religious
and
tive
history dernonstrating Congressional
ing] on-site inspections of appellant's
non-religious rnaterials; the determinaintent to grant exclusive jurisdiction to
evangelistic crusades, lengthy on-site autive test being whether the tax can be
the federal courts; or (3) there is a clear
dits, examinations of appellant's books
neutrally
irnposed
regardless
of
content,
between state court jurisincornpatibility
and records, threats of criminal prosecuwhether it acts as a prior restraint on
diction and federal interests. Tafflin, 110
tion, and layers of administrative and jureligious liberty, and whether any State
S. Ct. at 795 (quoting Gulf Offshore Co.
dicial proceedings." Id at 697 (quoting
imposing
the
tax
can
rernain
activities
in
v. Mobile Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613). In addressing
detached and neutral frorn the religiOUS
(1981».
this contention, the Court focused on
organization itself.
Applying the Gulf Offshore factors,
whether the imposition of the tax re-Cathy A. Cooper
the Court rejected the idea that state
sulted in an "excessive 'involvernent becourts have been divested of jurisdiction
tween appellant and the State and'
Ta.Dlin v. Levitt: STATE COURT
over civil RICO actions "by an explicit
continuing surveillance leading to an imJURISDICTION OVER CIVIL RICO
statutory directive." Id. at 795, (quoting
permissible degree of entanglernent," as
ClAIMS NOT PREEMPTED
Gulf0jfshore, 453 U.S. at 478). Further,
provided under Walz v. Tax Comm'n of
In Tafflin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792
as the Petitioners conceded, there was
New York City, 397 U.S. 664 (1970);
(1990), the United States Suprerne Court
no express language in RICO granting
Jimmy Swaggert Ministries, 110 S. Ct. at
detennined that state courts have conexclusive
federal juridiction over civil
current juridiction over civil actions
698. In holding that the spirit and values
RICO claims. The jurisdictional grant in
of the Establishment Clause were not
brought under the Racketeer Influenced
RICO provides: "[a]ny person injured in
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"),
even rernotely at issue in this case, the
his business or property by reason of a
18 U.S.c. §§ 1961.{)8.
Court noted that
violation of section 1962 of this chapter
the [tax] statutory scherne requires
Following the failure of Old Court Savmay sue therefor [sic] in any appropriate
neither the involvernent of state ernings & Loan, Inc. (hereinafter "Old
United
States district court .... " [d. at
ployees in, nor on-site continuing
Court"), the petitioners, non-residents of
796 (quoting 18 U.S.c. § 1964(c» (erninspection of, appellant's day-to-day
Maryland holding unpaid certificates of
phasis in orginal). The Court found
operations ... [and] [rn]ost signifideposit issued by Old Court, instituted an
Congress' use of "rnay" in RICO presuascantly, [it] does not require the State
action in federal district court against the
ive and noted that "[i]t is black letter law
to inquire into the religious content
respondents, fonner officers and direcof the items sold or the religious
... that the rnere grant of juridiction to a
tors of Old Court, the Maryland Savingscourt does not operate to oust a
rnotivation for selling or purchasing
federal
Share
Insurance
Corporation
the iterns, because the rnaterials are
state court frorn concurrent jurisdiction
(hereinafter "MSSIC"), fonner officers
subject to the tax regardless of conover the cause of action." [d. (quoting
and directors of MSSIC, Old Court and
tent or rnotive.
Gulf0jfshore, 453 U.S. at 479). AccordMSSIC's law finn, and Old Court's ac[d. at 699. Furtherrnore, the Court reingly, the Court found the grant offederal
counting firrn. In the cornplaint, the Pejected Appellant's assertion that the coljurisdiction over RICO cases to be pertitioners alleged several state law claims,
lection and payrnent of the tax irnposed
missive, not rnandatory. Id.
a clairn under the Securities and Exupon it a severe accounting burden.
Next, the Court considered the legislachange Act of 1934 (herinafter "ExThe Court stated that this allegation was
tive history of RICO . The Court found no
change
Act"),
and
a
civil
claim
under
clearly unsupported by the record
evidence that Congress considered the
RICO. The Respondents ftled a Motion to
which showed that any such burden
question of concurrent state court jurisDismiss
which
was
granted
by
the
diswas signillcantly eased by Appellant's
diction over civil RICO claims, rnuch less
trict court for two reasons. First, the dissophisticated accounting staff and cornany
suggestion of congressional intent to
court
granted
the
Respondent's
trict
puterized accounting systern. Even if
confer exclusive jurisdiction on the fedrnotion concluding that the Petitioners
substantial, the Court added that such
eral courts. The Petitioners posed two
failed to state a claim under the Exchange
record-keeping and adrninistrative burargurnents. First they contended that if
dens do not rise to a constitutionally
Act. The district court also determined
Congress had addressed the issue it
signillcant level. Id. at 698.
that the Petitioners' civil RICO claims
Finally, the Appellant asserted that the
would have granted the federal courts
would be disposed of in a pending state
use tax imposition violated the Comcourt action. Because the district court
exclusive jurisdiction. The Court rernerce and Due Process Clauses because
jected this argument refusing to specubelived that state courts have concurrent
of and insufficient "nexus" between the
jurisdiction over these claims, it deterlate as to Congress' intent. [d.
mined that federal abstention was
-State and itself as an out-of-state retailer.
Alternatively, the Petitioners relied on
appropiate. The district court ruling was
dicta in Sedima, S.P.R. V.L v. Imrex Co.,
The Court, however, refused to address
473 u.s. 479 (1985) andAgen0' Holding
afflrrned by the Fourth Circuit Court of
the rnerits of this claim due to the fact
30-The Law Forurn /20.3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Because of his worsening condition,
799 (citations omitted). The Court found
corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 u.s.
the Workers' Compensation Commis143 (1987), where the Court noted that
no merit in the Petitioners' procedural
Congress fashioned RICO after § 4 ofthe
sion reopened Victor's case and awarded
argument. Thus, the Court concluded
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.c. § 15(a). Relying on
him a continuation of his temporary total
that state courts have concurrent jurisdicta, Petitioners asserted that because
disability benefits. The Commission,
diction over civil RICO claims.
§ 4 of the Clayton Act has been interprehowever, ordered that the payment of
In the first of two concurring opinions,
ted to confer exclusive jurisdiction on
the award be suspended pending any
justice White agreed with the majority's
the federal courts, it should be inferred
appeal because it questioned whether
holding but wrote separately to express
that Congress intended, by the use of
such benefits, which are ordinarily
his fear that permitting concurrent jurissimilar language in RICO, that the Court
awarded until maximum medical imdiction over civil RICO actions would
interpret RICO the same way. The Court
provement is achieved, are available to a
inevitably
result
in
diverse
state
court
rejected this argument and pointed out
retired
claimant. On Proctor & Gamble's
interpretation
of
federal
criminal
law.
that "the question is not whether any
appeal
to
the Circuit Court for Baltimore
justice
White,
however,
did
not
believe
intent at all may be divined from legislaCity, the trial court reversed the
the possibility of non-uniform constructive silence on the issue, but whether
Commission's ruling, stating that the
tion warranted a rmding of exclusive fedCongress in its deliberations may be said
Act's purpose is not to provide additional
eral jurisdiction. Id. at BOO.
to have affirmatively or unmistakably inretirement benefits to a claimant who
tended jurisdiction to be exclusively fedjustice Scalia, joined by justice Kenvoluntarily removes himself from the
eral." TaJjlin, 110 S. Ct. at 797.
nedy, also wrote a concuring opinion.
work force. The court of appeals certiAdditionally, the petitioners argued
Both Justice Scalia and justice Kennedy
that to permit concurrent state court jufied the case before a ruling by the court
agreed with the majority's finding that a
risdiction over civil RICO claims would
of special appeals.
civil RICO claim does not meet any of the
be incompatible with federal interests.
In this case of first impression, the
three Gulf Offshore factors, and, therThe petitioners first maintained that fedcourt began its analysis by looking to the
fore, that state court jurisdicition was not
eral interests in a uniform interpretation
Act's purpose. As it had recognized in
preempted. However, neither justice
of federal criminal law would be frusprevious cases concerning the Act, the
Scalia
nor
justice
Kennedy
belived
that
trated if state courts were permitted to
court reiterated that "'[t]he general purthe
Gulf
Offshore
factors
should
be
the
hear civil RICO claims. Id. Further, they
pose
of the Workmen's Compensation
sole criteria for evaluation to determine
contended that for a state court to decide
Act [is] to provide compensation for loss
whether
state
court
jurisdiction
had
been
a civil RICO claim would require states to
of earning capaCity resulting from accipreempted.
determine which federal crimes constidental injuries sustained in industrial emDespite some minor disagreement
tute "racketeering activity" under RICO
ployment. ", Id at 630, 569 A.2d at 700
and would thereby create a diverse body
among the justices in TaJjlin, a unani(quoting
Bethlehem Shipyard v.
of precedent interpreting those crimes.
mous Court agreed that Congress had not
Damasiewicz,
187Md.474,480,50A.2d
Id. at 798. The Court rejected both of
intended to preempt state court jurisdiC799,802 (1947) (empasis added by the
Petitioner's arguments.
tion over civil RICO claims. Not only does
Victor court). Futhermore, the Act must
The Court explained that there would
the TaJjlin precedent confer greater
be
interpreted and construed to effectube no danger of inconsistent interpretapower to the states, but it serves as a
ate this purpose. Id. at 628, 569 A.2d at
tion of federal crimes because, pursuant
model for evaluating whether state court
699. The court also noted that there exto 18 U.S.c. § 3231, federal courts would
jurisdiction had been preempted.
ists a legislatively required presumption
retain "full authority and responsibility
-David B. Applefeld
in favor of injured employees that their
for the interpretation of federal criminal
Victor v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co.:
claims fall within the Act's provisions. Id.
law." Id. The Court also stated that the
VOLUNfARILY REfIRED CIAIMANf
at 628-29, 569 A.2d at 700.
federal courts would not be bound by
ENITILED TO TEMPORARY TOTAL
The Act itself, the court noted, estabstate court interpretations offederallaw.
DISABllJ1Y BENEFITS AFfER RETIRElishes the duties that employers owe to
Because this case involved civil RICO
MENf
their employees, providing, in part, that
claims, there was no danger of non-uniIn Victor v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg.
the employer shall payor provide comform imposition of federal criminal sancCo., 318 Md. 624, 569 A.2d 697 (1990),
pensation "[flor the disability or death
tions. Finally, the Court indicated that it
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held
of his employee resulting from an accihad "full faith in the ability of state courts
that a claimant who voluntarily retires is
dental personal injury sustained by the
to handle the complexities of civil RICO
entitled to the temporary total disability
employee arising out of and in the course
actions, particularly since many RICO
benefits under the Worker's Compensaof his employment .... n Id at 626 n.l,
cases involve asserted violations of state
tion
Act ("the Act"). In so holding, the
569 A.2d at 698 n.l (quoting Md. Ann.
law, such as state fraud claims, over
court reversed the trial court's ruling, and
Code art. 101 § 15 (1985 & Supp. 1989)
which state courts presumably have
upheld the decision of the Workers'
(emphasis added)). Such compensation
greater expertise. Id.
Compensation
Commission.
and benefits are referenced to disability
The Court briefly addressed the
Edward Victor, a Proctor and Gamble
petitioners' final contention that RICO's
throughout the statute. Thus, the court
employee, sustained a disability resulting
procedural mechanisms are applicable
reasoned, it is the" disability" arising from
from an accidental personal injury arising
the injury that calls for the compensation
only to federal court actions. The petiout of and in the course of his employand benefits, yet "disability" is not explictioners maintained that RICO provides
ment. He was first awarded total disabilfor extended venue and out of state seritly defined in the Act with respect to an
ity, and later, granted a supplemental
vice of process which the state court
injury arising from an industrial accident.
award for permanant partial disability.
systems could not properly handle. In
Id. at 629, 569 A.2d at 700.
Although Victor was physically able to
response, the Court pointed out that it
Thus, relying again on the Act's genwork at the time, he voluntarily retired
had "previously found concurrent juriseral purpose and the mandate of a liberal
from Proctor & Gamble. Subsequently,
construction in favor of injured employdiction even where federal law provided
his work-related condition worsened,
for special procedural mechanisms simees, the court set forth to define the
causing temporary total disability.
ilar to those contained in RICO." Id. at
legislative intent of an industrial accident
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